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This paper conducts a search for community structure in the South African company network, a social network whose 
elements are South African companies listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. Companies are connected in this 
network if they share one or more directors on their respective boards. Discovered clusters, called communities, can be 
considered to be compartments of the network working relatively independently of one another, making their 
distribution and composition of some interest. We test whether the discovered communities of companies are (a) 
statistically significant, and (b) related to other attributes such as sector membership or market capitalization. We also 
investigate the relationship between the centrality of a company’s position in the network and its market capitalization. 
 
 





For many years it has been popular to consider the causes 
and consequences of companies “interlocking” i.e. having 
one or more directors in common (e.g. see Davis, Yoo and 
Baker (2003) for a review). In more recent times, the 
abundance of directorship information and new techniques 
for the analysis of complex systems has led to a focus on the 
entire system of partially interlocked companies within a 
corporate landscape (usually but not necessarily a country). 
In this mode of research, one views the collection of 
companies as a social network – a graph in which a set of 
nodes (the companies) are linked together by edges 
indicating the presence of some kind of social relationship, 
in this case the presence of one or more common directors 
on both boards i.e. an interlock.  
 
This type of analysis is unconventional in two respects. 
Firstly, it focuses on the relationships between entities rather 
than on the attributes of independent sampling units. 
Secondly, it aims to describe the structure of the system as a 
whole rather than assess the individual entities. Taken 
together this allows one to describe the extent and nature of 
“interconnectedness” in a corporate system using a small 
number of summary statistics. Analyses of corporate board 
networks have been conducted for the US (Newman, 
Strogatz & Watts, 2001; Davis et al., 2003; Conyon & 
Muldoon, 2006), UK (Conyon & Muldoon, 2006), Germany 
(Conyon & Muldoon, 2006; Kogut & Belinky, 2008), 
Switzerland and the Netherlands (Heemskerk & Schnyder, 
2008), Denmark, Sweden and Norway (Sinani et al., 2008), 
and South Africa (Durbach & Parker, 2009). 
 
New analytical methods have made it possible to consider 
networks in ever greater detail. An important development is 
the assessment of whether the nodes making up a social 
network can be organised into clusters, such that many 
relationships exist between members of the same cluster and 
comparatively few exist between members of different 
clusters. Such clusters, also called communities, can be 
considered to be compartments of the network working 
relatively independently of one another (Fortunato, 2010).  
An example of a network with strong community structure 
is shown in Figure 1. Community detection has found 
application in many areas: networks of interacting proteins 
(Rives & Galitski, 2003), gene expression networks 
(Wilkinson & Huberman, 2004), metabolic networks 
(Holme, Huss & Jeong, 2003), mobile phone 
communications (Blondel et al., 2008), and collaboration 
networks between academics (Girvan & Newman, 2002). 
 
In this paper, we conduct a search for community structure 
in the South African company network (shown in Figure 1), 
a social network in which the nodes are South African 
companies listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (at 
March 2008), and two companies are connected if they 
share one or more directors on their respective boards. We 
also test whether the discovered communities of companies 
are related to other attributes such as sector and market 
capitalization, and investigate the relationship between the 








Figure 1: On the left, an example of a network with a strong community structure (there are three clear clusters or 
“communities” indicated by the dashed ellipses). On the right, the South African company network as of March 2008.  
 
 
The paper is structured as follows: we begin by giving a 
brief introduction to network statistics, followed by a 
summary of previous research on interlocking corporate 
boards. We then describe the company network used for this 
study and the algorithm used to detect community structure 
respectively. The main results are then presented: first basic 
descriptive results; then community detection results; and 
finally results obtained from an additional investigation into 
the relationship between network centrality and market 




In this section the example network in Figure 1 is used to 
illustrate various quantities of interest. The network shows 
the existence of some form of relational tie (edges) between 
entities (nodes). Edges may be undirected or directed, 
although here our interest is limited to the undirected case. If 
two nodes are connected by a single edge they are known as 
adjacent, with nodes B and C being an example of a pair of 
adjacent nodes. Adjacencies can be collected into an 
adjacency matrix A with elements       if nodes   and   
are connected and 0 otherwise. Higher values for     are 
possible if multiple edges are allowed between nodes, but 
this will not concern us here. The adjacency matrix plays a 
prominent role in many network computations, including 
ones we consider later. 
 
In discussing the connectivity of a network and its 
constituent nodes, two measures are of fundamental 
importance: degree and distance. The degree of a node is 
simply the number of edges leaving that node. The degrees 
of nodes A, B, and C in Figure 1 are 7, 5, and 4 respectively. 
The geodesic distance (or just ‘distance’) between a pair of 
nodes is given by the smallest number of edges that must be 
traversed to get to one node from the other. The distance 
between nodes A and B is 3 while nodes B and C are 
separated by a distance of 1. Intuitively it is clear that nodes 
within the same community should tend to be separated 
from each other by smaller distances than nodes in different 
communities.  
 
Causes and consequences of “interlocks” 
between companies 
 
Previously hypothesised causes of interlocks include 
collusion, coopting sources of environmental uncertainty, 
monitoring, enhancing reputation and legitimacy, career 
advancement, and elite social ties (Mizruchi, 1996). With 
the exception of collusion (Pennings, 1980), evidence exists 
in favour of all these hypothesised causes, but this evidence 
tends to vary from study to study. Both Thompson and 
McEwen (1959) and Burt (1983) found evidence suggesting 
cooptation as a source of interlocks, but Ornstein (1980) and 
Palmer (1983) found that ties broken by death or retirement 
are not re-established, mitigating against cooptation. 
Monitoring explanations have been supported in Dooley 
(1969) and Mizruchi and Stearns (1988), with unprofitable 
companies found to be more likely to form interlocks, 
especially with banks (Richardson, 1987; Mizruchi & 
Stearns, 1988). Mace (1971) and Useem (1984) found that 
directors are often chosen on the basis of their own 
reputation, and these may be used to signal the reputation of 
the company on whose board they sit (Selznick, 1984). As a 
consequence, directors are more likely to be nominated to 
new boards if they are already a member of several boards 
(Davis, 1993). The link between reputation and membership 
of the upper social stratum has been supported by Zeitlin 
(1974) and Useem (1984).  
 
The research into the consequences of interlocks for 
company behaviour is well summarised by Mizruchi (1996), 
while Davis, Yoo and Baker (2003) and Di Pietra et al. 
(2008) present more recent evidence. To summarise, 
interlocking directorates have been shown to facilitate the 
adoption of executive compensation practices such as 
“golden parachutes” (Cochran, Wood & Jones, 1985), 
“greenmail” (Kosnik, 1987), and “poison pills” (Davis, 
1991; Davis & Greve, 1997). Others have found that the 
amount of external financing a company receives is related 
to bank representation on its board (Mizruchi & Stearns, 
1988). Interlocks also serve to facilitate contributions to 
political candidates and congressional testimony (Mizruchi, 




exchanges (Rao, Davis & Ward, 2000). Di Pietra et al. 
(2008) find that the number of additional directorships held 
by a board of directors (expressed as a proportion of board 
size) has a positive association with the market value of a 
company. Interlocked directors tend to be less effective at 
monitoring (Fich & Shivdasani, 2006) and more likely to be 




The network that we investigate comprises the boards of 
directors of all JSE-listed South African companies as at 1 
March 2008. This information was obtained from the 
McGregor BFA database and checked manually for 
consistency. One problem that arises is that companies may 
provide different levels of detail in the names of their 
directors, for example in the number of initials that are 
specified. In some cases it is clear that the director is in fact 
the same person (for example, NJM Canca and NJMG 
Canca are presumably the same person), but in other cases 
the correct decision is not clear. Our approach has been to 
treat any names which are identical in surname and first 
initial as belonging to the same person. The full dataset 
consists of 2653 directors and 397 companies, but the 
community detection algorithm is run on the largest 
connected component of the network consisting of 2048 




“Communities” generally refer to subsets of nodes that are 
more densely interconnected among one another than with 
nodes in the rest of the network i.e. outside their community. 
The search for community structure thus becomes the search 
for “a statistically surprising arrangement of edges” 
(Newman, 2006). Most current algorithms for detecting 
community structure assign nodes to communities so as to 
optimize some pre-specified quality function. Reichardt and 
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    are elements of the adjacency matrix,  (     )    if 
nodes   and   are in the same community and is 0 otherwise, 
and                 are weights of the relative contributions 
made by present within-community edges, missing within-
community edges, present between-community edges, and 
absent between-community edges respectively. The four 
summation terms in the above equation correspond 
respectively to (a) rewarding existing edges between nodes 
of the same community (since     (     )    if and only if 
nodes of the same community are connected); (b) penalizing 
missing edges between nodes of the same community (since 
        (     )    if and only if nodes of the same 
community are not connected); (c) penalizing existing edges 
between nodes of different communities (since       
 (     )    if and only if nodes in differing communities 
are connected); and (d) rewarding missing edges between 
nodes of different communities (since           
 (     )    if and only if nodes in differing communities 
are not connected). 
 
Different authors have used a number of approaches to 
optimise the equation above; see Fortunato (2010) for a 
review. Reichardt and Bornholdt (2006) begin by assigning 
the same importance to connections between nodes in the 
same community as to those between nodes in different 
communities i.e. setting         and        . This means 
that it is only necessary to consider present and absent 
connections between nodes in the same community (i.e. the 
last two terms in the above equation can be ignored). They 
then select weights            and         , where     
denotes the expected number of edges between nodes   and   
and   is a parameter giving the importance of present edges 
relative to absent edges. The choice for     means that 
greater rewards accrue if two nodes with an existing but 
statistically “surprising” connection are assigned to the same 
community. Similarly, the choice for     means that greater 
penalties result if two nodes that are “expected” to be 
connected but in reality are not, are assigned to the same 
community. The form taken by     can be tailored for 
specific types of networks. In most cases (including ours) 
the     are set to        , where    is the degree of node   
and   is the total number of nodes. This indicates that edges 
are more probable between nodes which themselves have 
many edges, but other choices for     can be used to 
indicate, for example, assortativity (degree-degree 
correlation), random graphs, or bipartite graphs. These 
choices of coefficients mean that the resulting quality 
function simplifies to: 
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Optimizating the above function for large networks is 
computationally very intensive. Reichardt and Bornholdt 
(2006) use methods from statistical mechanics to 
reformulate the optimization problem in terms of finding the 
ground state configuration that minimizes the energy of an 
“infinite range Potts spin glass”. Full details of the method 
can be found in the original reference, and need not concern 
us here, although it is worth noting some of its advantages. 
Firstly, the reformulated quality, given by 
 












the first sum runs over the set of all edges   and    is the 
sum of degrees of nodes in community  , is computationally 




standard approaches like simulated annealing (Kirkpatrick, 
Gelatt & Vecchi., 1983). Secondly, a single, easily 
interpreted parameter   governs the relative weight assigned 
to present and missing edges; when     the total 
contribution that can be made by present and missing edges 
is equal. Thirdly, it is a general model that, for example, 
includes the ‘most popular quality function’ (Fortunato, 
2010) based on ‘modularity’ (Newman & Girvan, 2004) 
when    . Finally, the method can be used to compute the 
expected modularity for a ‘null model’ i.e. a random graph 
with the same number of nodes and average degree; the 
modularity of a discovered community structure must 
exceed that of the null model in order to be considered 
statistically significant. We used the implementation of 
Reichardt and Bornholdt (2006) available in the statistical 




Basic network results 
 
Table 1 gives a brief overview of the South African 
company network. The average number of directors sitting 
on the board of a JSE-listed company is 8,56, ranging 
greatly from just two directors to 27. This is comparable to 
values reported by Conyon and Muldoon (2006) for the 
USA (9,97 members), the UK (6,51 members) and Germany 
(6,33 members). The average number of directorships held 
is 1,28, and the overwhelming majority of directors (83%) 
are members of just a single board. This is marginally lower 
than those reported by Conyon and Muldoon for the USA 
(1,63 directorships), UK (1,84 memberships) or Germany 
(1,45 memberships). There are just 32 directors (1,2%) who 
hold five or more board memberships. A JSE-listed 
company is directly connected to an average of 5,2 other 
companies, although this average increases to 6,9 if 
companies that are not connected to the largest component 
are excluded.   
 
 
Table 1: Basic descriptive and network statistics for the South African company network as at 1 March 2008 
 
 Full network Largest component 
Number of firms 397 294 
Average board size 8,56 (0,19) 9,40 (0,22) 
Director seats 3398 2764 
Unique directors 2653 2048 
% of one-board directors 83% 79% 
Average company degree 5,23 (0,29) 6,92 (0,34) 
Average distance between companies 3,65 (0,06) 3,65 (0,06) 
 
 
Community structure results 
 
The essential features of the South African company 
network as shown in Figure 1 appear to be that (a) a 
relatively large number of highly interconnected companies 
appear in the center of the network, and (b) other companies 
are peripheral to this central cluster of companies, being 
connected to it only by a distance of a few degrees. This 
structure presents a clear difficulty for community detection. 
Nevertheless, the communities detected by the algorithm of 
Reichardt and Bornholdt (2006) do exhibit some statistically 
significant associations. Figure 2 shows the communities 
detected by a ‘neutral’ application of the algorithm, in which 
absent edges between members of a community are viewed 
as equally important as present edges. Nodes represent 
companies, with edges denoting membership to a common 
cluster. Nodes are coloured according to their sector and the 
size of a node is proportional to its market capitalization. 
For comparative purposes, the community structure detected 
using the algorithm in a ‘conservative’ mode (with      ) 
is shown in Figure 4 in the appendix. The former identifies 
14 communities and the size of these communities decreases 
in an approximately linear fashion; the latter identifies 12 
communities, one of which is much larger than all the others 
(an in fact contains some 50% of all companies). It must be 
acknowledged that a direct qualitative interpretation of these 
system-wide summary statistics is still lacking – it is not yet 
known how, or even whether, network statistics like the 
number of communities or the distribution of cluster sizes 
affect the performance of the economy. Investigating these 
important topics would require longitudinal data, ideally for 
a number of countries, and as such is beyond the scope of 
the current study. We set ourselves the more modest task of 
assessing whether the fact that two firms belong to the same 
economic sector, or have similar levels of market 
capitalization, make them significantly more likely to 
belong to the same community (which, recall, is dictated 
only by arrangements of directorships).  
 
The modularity of the detected configuration of nodes into 
communities is 0,53. This is well above the ‘null’ model 
modularity of 0,36, suggesting that the communities found 
have at least some statistical relevance over and above what 
would have been expected from a random graph. Moreover, 
there is a significant association between cluster 
membership and each of sector membership and market 
capitalization, two exogenous variables not used in the 
clustering process (sector: chi
2
 = 170,0, DoF = 96, p < 
0,001; log(market capitalization): F = 2,66, DoF = 12, 280, p 
= 0,002), although because of the small sizes of some 
clusters these p-values cannot be trusted entirely. From 
Figure 2 itself, it is clear that there is some tendency for 
companies of a similar market capitalization and sector to 
appear in the same cluster. For example, 67% of all 




one community 14 out of 31 companies are based in the 
industrial sector. In one relatively small community of 15 
companies, 7 are in the real estate sector. Other sectors are 
somewhat more evenly dispersed between communities. 
Significant market capitalization clustering occurs mainly 
between companies with high market capitalizations – 27 of 
the 56 companies in the upper quintile of market 
capitalization belong to just 2 of the 13 communities. Our 
conclusions remain the same using either of the community 
structures in Figure 2 or 4. 
 
Taken together, our results suggest that companies of the 
same sector (particularly industrial and real estate) and 
companies with high market capitalization exhibit a greater-
than-expected tendency to form inter-relationships with one 
another through common directors on their boards. As 
indicated by the previous research summarized above, such 
a tendency can be expected to play a significant role in the 
sharing of information and some elements of company 
culture and behaviour. 
 
Centrality and market capitalization  
 
In this section we consider the effect of the centrality of a 
company’s position in the company network on its market 
capitalization. That is, we ask whether companies that 
occupy more central positions in the network tend to have 
higher or lower market capitalization values. In doing so, it 
is important to control for the effect of board size. 
Companies with large market capitalizations will tend to 
require larger boards to manage them, so that one would 
expect a positive relationship between board size and market 
capitalization (e.g. Lincke, Netter & Yang, 2008). Since, as 
we have seen, larger boards also tend to possess higher 
centrality (Durbach & Parker, 2009), there is an obvious 
need to control for board size when examining the 
relationship between centrality and market capitalization.  
 
We do this by fitting a series of quantile regression models 
(using the quantiles q = 5%, 10%, 20%, 30%, 40%, 50%, 
60%, 70%, 80%) to the 378 companies for which we were 
able to obtain market capitalization information. Models 
were fitted using degree as a measure of centrality, while 
controlling for board size. Board sizes and degree 
centralities were first centered around their means so that the 
intercept term can be more easily interpreted (Koenker & 
Hallock, 2001). Figure 3 shows the results obtained from the 
model using board size and degree centrality as independent 
variables. The solid line plots the parameter estimates 
obtained at various quantiles, while the dashed lines indicate 
95% confidence intervals around those estimates. The 
parameter values can be interpreted as the effect of a one-














Figure 3: Quantile regression estimates for the effect of board size and degree centrality on market capitalization (in 
millions of Rands) 
 
 
The models verify the positive relationship between board 
size and market capitalization, though as indicated by the 
positive slope of the solid line in the Board size plot, this 
effect tends to be considerably larger in the upper quantiles 
of the distribution. For example, a company with 1 more 
director than another company has an approximately R50 
million greater market value at the 5% quantile (i.e. at very 
low levels of market capitalization), but a R424 million 
greater value at the 0,50 quantile (i.e. median market 
capitalization) and over R1 billion greater value at the 80% 
quantile (i.e. at higher levels of market capitalization). Thus, 
while it appears true to say that in general companies with 
bigger boards tend to have bigger market capitalizations, the 
difference between a company with a small board and one 
with a big board tends to be far more pronounced at higher 
levels of market capitalization than at lower levels.  
 
Our models also find a strong positive relationship between 
degree centrality and market capitalization, even after 
controlling for the effect of board size. The coefficient of the 
degree centrality effect is positive and significant at the 1% 
level over all of the quantiles, indicating that companies 
having higher numbers of connections to other companies 
tend to have higher market capitalization. Similarly to the 
effect of board size, the degree centrality effect is smaller in 
the lower quantiles of the distributions, increasing in 
magnitude as the market capitalization quantile increases. At 
the median quantile, companies with a single additional 
connection have an approximately R180 million greater 
market capitalization. At the 5% and 80% quantiles, this 
figure is R24 million and R954 million respectively. Simply 
put, the difference in the market capitalization of a highly-
connected company and a poorly-connected company whose 
market values are both in the lower quantiles of their 
respective conditional distributions is not that large. But that 
same difference can be a full order of magnitude greater 
when those companies are both in the upper quantiles of 
their respective conditional distributions. Thus both 
centrality and the size of a company’s board have larger 
effects for companies with relatively large market 
capitalizations. This suggests that limited connectivity and a 
small board can constrain market capitalization, but that the 
converse does not necessarily apply to the same degree – 
being central or having a large board does not ensure high 
market capitalization. Interestingly, there is a large jump in 
the magnitude of the effect which occurs around the 60% 
quantile. At smaller quantiles, the centrality effect increases 
slightly as the market capitalization quantile increases. 
Beyond the 60% quantile, however, the size of the effect 
increases dramatically. This further suggests that there may 
be some sort of “critical mass” beyond which inter-firm 
connectivity exerts its full effect. 
 
Finally, and predominantly for completeness, the intercept 
may be interpreted as the estimated conditional quantile 
function of the market capitalization distribution for a 
“typical” company (one with 8,65 board members and 5,2 
connections to other companies, these figures reflecting the 
sample mean board size and degree respectively). Thus the 
10% quantile for such a company’s market capitalization is 
estimated to be R406 million; the 80% quantile is estimated 




This paper provides a coherent framework of (1) assessing 
whether companies in the South African company network 
can be organised into communities such that dense 
connections exist between members of the same community 
and relatively fewer connections exist between members of 
different communities; (2) investigating the relationship 
between identified communities within the South African 
company network and each of the attributes “sector 
membership” and “market capitalization”; and (3) how the 
statistical tool of quantile regression can be used to both 
measure the effect of board size as well as of degree 
centrality in the South African company network on market 
capitalization, and control for board size while measuring 
the effect of degree centrality on market capitalization. 
 
Though the South African Company network’s structure 
presents some difficulty for community detection, an 
application of the Reichardt and Bornholdt algorithm 
resulted in communities that are statistically significant 











































































regardless of whether γ is set to 1 (a “neutral” value) or 0,5 
(a more “conservative” value favouring the formation of 
larger communities). A statistically significant relationship 
has been detected between community membership and 
each of sector membership and market capitalization. Most 
companies with similar market capitalizations and sectors 
tend to regroup through common directors under the same 
community. Since edges are formed by common 
membership on a board of directors, this indicates that a 
director on the board of a company in one community is 
more likely to be on the board of another company in the 
same community. The presence of companies from the same 
sector in the same community may perhaps raise some 
warning signs for corporate governance, but we do not have 
any data to test this and a deeper investigation of this issue 
goes beyond the scope of the current paper. 
 
The constructed quantile regression models reveal a positive 
relationship between board size as well as degree centrality 
and market capitalization. These results show that 
companies that are more central (as measured by degree 
centrality) tend to have larger market capitalizations, even 
after controlling for board size. The results also showed that 
the magnitude of these effects increases at higher quantiles 
of the conditional market capitalization distribution. That is, 
centrality and board size both have larger effects for 
companies with relatively large market capitalizations. This 
suggests that limited connectivity and a small board can 
constrain market capitalization, but that the converse does 
not necessarily apply – being central or having a large board 
does not ensure high market capitalization. 
 
Appendix: Community structure results with more 
conservative clustering 
 
Figure 4 and Table 2 respectively show the discovered 
communities and statistical associations between 
communities and sector membership and market 
capitalization, using a more conservative application of 
Reichardt and Bornholdt (2006) in which   is set to 0,5 i.e. 
existing edges are viewed as more important than missing 
edges. The modularity of the detected configuration is 0,59, 
which is (as for the more aggressive clustering) well above 
the ‘null’ modularity score of 0,36, suggesting a statistically 
significant arrangement of nodes into communities. 
Conclusions are as for the communities detected with γ set 
to 1 i.e. there is a significant tendency for companies of a 
similar market capitalization and sector to appear together in 





Figure 4: Communities in the South African company network, obtained with a more ‘conservative’ clustering 








Table 2: Association between the communities found in Figure 4 and sector membership and market capitalization 
 
  Test used Test stat DoF p 
Sector Chi-square 116,5 72 <0,001 
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